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Guest editorial

Editorial note:
The authors of this paper have asked
to have their names withheld. The JPN
editorial team do not usually agree to
such requests, but we have made an
exception in this case. As you will read,
there is significant animosity between
Nurse Practitioners and the federal health
bureaucracy. Real or otherwise, the
authors fear potential reprisals for calling
out what they see as prejudicial behaviour
against their community.

The good, the bad and the ugly:
Nurse Practitioners and the
politics of health care
The good
Nurse Practitioners (NPs) are highly
educated health care professionals
and the only advanced practice
nurses recognised and regulated
by the Nursing and Midwifery
Board of Australia. The purpose
of implementing the NP role was
to improve the flexibility of the
Australian health care system and
increase patient access to health
care1. The endorsement of the first
two Australian NPs took place in
December 2000, and now over 22002
NPs provide comprehensive patient
care across a diverse range of
health care continuums3,4. Through
collaborative, safe, and effective care,
the NP provides value-based health
care across the public and private
health care sectors5.
In 2009, then Minister for Health
Nicola Roxon, led historic health
reform resulting in the Health
Legislation Amendment (Midwives
and Nurse Practitioners) Act 2010.
This legislation enabled patient
access, albeit limited, to the Medical
Benefits Schedule (MBS) and the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule
(PBS) for eligible NPs6. As a result,
private patients choosing to see an
NP for their health care can claim
limited Medicare subsidies for
services and medicines arising from
NP-directed care in primary health
care settings.
The MBS and PBS reforms have
truly been transformative for the
Australian NP role. No longer
restricted by often rigid public sector
NP models of care, that limit nursing
scope of practice and innovation7–9,
NPs are increasingly moving to the
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private sector to actualise the full
potential of their roles and explore
innovative models of care10.

The bad
More than a decade later, of the 5700
items listed on the MBS, patients
are still limited to a handful of
subsidies for NP-directed care11.
These include subsidies for face-toface and telehealth consultations, a
comprehensive array of diagnostic
pathology items, limited diagnostic
imaging requests and limited pointof-care tests performed by NPs11.
Evidence suggests NPs often achieve
the same or better outcomes in
delivering primary care services
compared to doctors12,13. Despite
this, the Australian government
uses taxpayer dollars to increase
subsidies for patients seeking care
from doctors, thereby giving the
medical profession an unfair market
advantage over NPs providing those
same services. After ten years of
participation in the MBS and PBS,
there is no evidence that suggests
services performed by NPs are
inferior, unsafe or ineffective when
compared to doctors. One has to
ask why the Australian Department
of Health (DoH) refuses to broaden
the scope of subsidised services
offered by NPs. The answer may
lie in the lobbying influence of
medical associations influencing
DoH bureaucrats to assist with turf
protection for the financial benefit
of doctors and not the benefit of
patients14.
When looking at consultations alone,
MBS subsidies are over 50 per cent
higher for general practitioners,
who are also afforded additional
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incentives for ‘bulk billing’ their
patients. Bulk billing transfers the
patient’s subsidy directly to the
health practitioner. No special
incentives exist for NPs who bulk
bill their patients. Such Australian
government policies assure that only
the medical profession can provide
universal health care through bulkbilled MBS services. The existing MBS
subsidies ensure that bulk-billing
NPs can neither sustain themselves
financially nor practise independently.
To maintain financial viability, NPs are
increasingly passing the costs of care
provision onto patients. In effect, the
Australian DoH is consciously shifting
health expenses to the consumer
regarding NP-related primary health
care, as it is nearly impossible for
NPs to earn a living on a bulk-billed
income alone.
Current MBS subsidies limit patient
access to health care and, for some
patients, remove the choice of who
delivers their health care. Attempts
by NPs to change the limited access
to the MBS include 14 evidenceinformed primary health care
recommendations compiled by the
Nurse Practitioner Reference Group
(NPRG)15 for the MBS Review. There
were also numerous professional
body and individual clinician
submissions to the MBS Review. In
their capacity as representatives of
peak professional bodies, NPs and
many other nursing leaders met
many times with government to
lobby for broadening MBS subsidies
to address crucial health care
shortfalls. All of these attempts
have been unsuccessful16. Of note,
the membership of the MBS Review
Taskforce had no representation
from the nursing profession and
consisted almost entirely of medical
practitioners, except for one policy
expert and one health consumer.
Medical associations representing
medical practitioners have clearly
articulated their position on the
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NP role. These positions are not
supported with evidence but with
the use of misinformation and
scare tactics17–19. Compounding this
situation are press releases outlining
how the Australian government and
medical associations are working
together to co-design administrative
processes to support future changes
to the MBS, which leaves little
confidence that the patients of NPs
will receive fair subsidies20.
The experience of NP surgical
assistants also demonstrates
the notion of a medico-centric
approach to administering the MBS
by the Australian DoH. Aside from
input into the MBS Review process,
the NP surgical assistants have
unsuccessfully tried to navigate the
Medical Services Advisory Committee
(MSAC) process. The role of MSAC
is to appraise health care services
for public funding21. NP surgical
assistants have demonstrated they
offer an effective22 and legitimate23
alternative to medically qualified
surgical assistants and increase
patient access to surgical care24. Yet,
attempts to gain access to the MBS
surgical assisting patient rebates via
applications to the MSAC committee
have failed. Both applications failed
in the pre-assessment phase. Like
the MBS Review Taskforce, the
MSAC committee has no nursing
representation, with 16 of the current
21 positions occupied by medical
practitioners.
At face value, the above observations
appear anti-competitive in nature.
This proposed anti-competitive
culture of the Australian DoH makes
one wonder if the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 applies, or if the
powers of the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC),
the independent statutory authority
that enforces the Act, pertain to
those administering the MBS. The
ACCC is investigating if the Australian
DoH has a case to answer. The

ACCC has also suggested that
the Commonwealth Ombudsman
may be an alternative avenue
for NPs to consider. The role of
the Commonwealth Ombudsman
is to assure that Australian
Government entities act with
integrity, treat people fairly and
influence improvements in public
administration25.

The ugly
Failing meaningful intervention from
the ACCC or the Commonwealth
Ombudsman, the law of torts may
be a final possibility. Torts law is
concerned with awarding damages
to individuals to repair the harm
caused by a breach of obligation26,27.
The tort of misfeasance applies to a
person occupying a public office who
exceeds or abuses public power28
or breaches their obligations27. Two
points for consideration here are:
1. that occupancy of public office
implies a public position, but this
is not limited to those appointed
to a statutory office; there is no
definitive test to determine what
incorporates public office
2. the notion of public law
obligation considers public
officials owe a duty of care not to
abuse their powers29.
Misfeasance is ‘the wrongful
performance of a normally lawful act;
the wrongful and injurious exercise
of lawful authority’30. This tort does
not apply to everyone employed by
a public authority; the courts have
outlined that the public official must
have a significant position with
relevant power and accountability to
the plantiff27. To establish the tort of
misfeasance, the plaintiff must prove
that in the alleged discharge of the
public official’s duty, their act was
invalid or unauthorised, malicious
and caused harm to the plantiff31.
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The MBS Review Taskforce aimed to
align the MBS with contemporary
clinical evidence and practice by
providing recommendations for
reform to the Minister for Health.
The aims were to support affordable
and universal access, best-practice
health services, value for the
individual patient and value for
the health care system15. The MBS
Review Taskforce did not endorse any
recommendations from the NPRG
but did propose three ‘alternative’
recommendations without any
evidence or rationale to support
them. This action was outside the
MBS Review’s terms of reference and
highlighted not only poor Australian
DoH governance processes but also
the genuinely medico-centric nature
of the MBS Review process.
Members of the MBS Review
Taskforce were in significant positions
of power and had accountability to
patients and NPs, not solely medical
practitioners. The taskforce was
predominately comprised of medical
practitioners engaged by a medicocentric DoH.
Members of the taskforce had many
opportunities to discuss and engage
with NPs and nursing groups, who
highlighted the importance of both
comprehensive MBS access for
patient care and reduced out-ofpocket expenses. The failure of the
taskforce members to recognise
these highly skilled health care
professionals and ignore the
evidence they provided has impacted
many NPs’ mental health. Their
primary source of distress relates to
their patients who, due to the current
MBS restrictions, cannot access
subsidised health care and have
sometimes experienced unacceptable
delays or duplication in care that has
contributed to patient harm, as well
as breaches in patient confidentiality.
Disregarding NPRG recommendations
and proposing irrelevant substitute
recommendations, knowing these

would restrict the NPs ability to
provide patient care, may enable
action in misfeasance against
taskforce members.
Finally, one should note there may
be unintended consequences to the
staunch resistance of the medical
lobby to patient subsidies for NPdirected care. Medical turf protection
and non-collaboration may
ultimately result in a parallel system
of primary health care providers, who
actively compete for the patients and
businesses of high-paying health
consumers. This can be seen with NPs
who are turning to niche specialty
practices funded solely by out-ofpocket payments because they can’t
earn a living serving the marginalised
populations they were educated and
trained to care for. This serves no one,
with losers on both sides.
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